Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program
Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written , and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.
Enrichment
● Iran
has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges.
Iran will go from having about 19,000
installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10
years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran’s first-generation centrifuge.
● Iran
has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
● Iran
has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of
low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of
3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
● All
excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA
monitored storage and will be used only
as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
● Iran
has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium
for 15 years.
● Iran’s
breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough
fissile material for one weapon – is
currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration
of at least ten years, under this framework.
Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to
enrich uranium
● Iran
has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15
years.
● Iran
has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful
purposes only – into a nuclear, physics,
technology, research center.
● Iran
has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.
● Iran
will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.
● Almost
two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich
uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring. Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz
facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation
centrifuges for ten years.
● Iran
has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing
its more advanced centrifuges.
● Iran
will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and
place them in IAEA monitored storage for
ten years.
● Iran
will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched
uranium for at least ten years. Iran
will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule
and parameters which have been agreed to
by the P5+1.
● For
ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited
to ensure a breakout timeline of at
least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan
submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the
JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on
enrichment capacity.
Inspections and Transparency
● The
IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to
Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and
its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern
monitoring technologies.
● Inspectors
will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program.
The new transparency and inspections
mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret
program.
● Inspectors
will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25
years.
● Inspectors
will have continuous surveillance of Iran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20
years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous
surveillance.
● All
centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will
be placed under continuous monitoring by
the IAEA.
● A
dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear program will be established
to monitor and approve, on a case by
case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual use
materials and technology – an additional
transparency measure.
● Iran
has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the
IAEA much greater access and information
regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
● Iran
will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites
or allegations of a covert enrichment
facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility
anywhere in the country.
● Iran
has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.
● Iran
will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns
regarding the Possible Military
Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
Reactors and Reprocessing
● Iran
has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak,
based on a design that is agreed to by
the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear
research and radioisotope production.
● The
original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of
significant quantities of weapons-grade
plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
● Iran
will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the
reactor’s lifetime.
● Iran
has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research
and development on spent nuclear
fuel.
● Iran
will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak
reactor, and will sell any remaining
heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
● Iran
will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.
Sanctions
Sanctions
● U.S.
and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has
verified that Iran has taken all of its
key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back
into place.
● The
architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for
much of the duration of the deal and
allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.
● All
past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be
lifted simultaneous with the completion,
by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and
transparency).
● However,
core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal
with transfers of sensitive technologies
and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse
the JCPOA and urge its full
implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned
above, which will serve as a key
transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions
that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this
new resolution.
● A
dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA
participant, to seek to resolve
disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
● If
an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that
process, then all previous UN sanctions
could be re-imposed.
● U.S.
sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles
will remain in place under the
deal.
Phasing
● For
ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and
development – ensuring a breakout
timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment
research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.
● For
fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For
instance, Iran will not build new
enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile
of enriched uranium and accept enhanced
transparency procedures.
● Important
inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol
of the IAEA is permanent, including its
significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections
of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last
for 25 years.
● Even
after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program,
Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons
and requires IAEA safeguards on its
nuclear program.